I will instead address Professor Johnson's defense of Merleau-Ponty's nostalgia. To my mind, there are two very revealing statements made by Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard in one of the essays whieh is key to the Merleau-PontylLyotard debate. The two statements are both quoted by Professor Johnson, but they are worth returning to. The first statement is, quoting Lyotard, in "Philosophy and Painting in the Age of their Experimentation: Contribution to an Idea of Post modernity: W The arroganee of philosophers is metaphysies. This arroganee, Lyotard extends to Merleau-Ponty even in his writings on painting sinee, as Lyotard would have it, Merleau-Ponty's semiologieal deck contains eards that exhibit metaphysical suits. Aeeording to Lyotard, we get a peek at Merleau-Ponty's eards even in "The Eye and the Mind" beeause Merleau-Ponty favors Cezanne and Giaeometti over Duchamp, Marey and the ellbists. The hidden premise here is that Cezanne and Giaeometti would give us a representation or at least a figuration of how things really are. They privilege the being of things, of "Mt. Sainte Vietoire," of wThe Blue Vase" or for that matter of "The Cardplayers, Wfor example in the ease of Cezanne. But Professor Lyotard also says of Merleau-Ponty: "[he is) one of the least arrogant of philosophers," (ibid). Professor Johnson addresses these ineompatible statements of Lyotard by telling us--and I think he does so very instruetively--that in "The Eye and the Mind" and also in the late work, posthumously entitled "The Visible and the Invisible, • that Merleau-Ponty giv8S us the germs of a ·postmodern metaphysic.· I think this intriguing encapsulization is worth developing, even in only -these few minutes of comments.
We can thank Lyotard, along with others--with Derrida and Kristeva to mention only some of the most influential--for exposing semiologically the many transgressions of metaphysicalizing. Let me cite a very partial roll call of some of the deadlier transgressions of metaphysicalizing:
First, metaphysicalizing tends to position one category of Being over another. Thus schools of philosophy from Existentialism to Pragmatism, for example, all secretly promote subjectivity to a prominence which aids and abets everything from hyperindividualism to cultural autism. fostered by the mass media, so it's been argued.
Second, metaphysicalizing leads one to seek after essences. One misguidely seeks to establish what something is as such, and, consequently ons engenders beliefs about what is normal and proper in a persons or things. This, so it is argued, can promote biases of many sorts, which include everything from Eurocentricism to a justification for the vivisection of animals.
Third, it's been argued that metaphysicalizing can privilege a single language, most scandalously Greek, or German, or perhaps Sanskrit, over. and above other language's because, for whatever reasons' other languages, so it's claimed, don't accommodate themselves to the evocation of Being.
Fourth, metaphysicalizing can promote a particular profession or calling. For better or worse, it can promoteperhaps poets, perhaps set-theoreticians, or perhaps artificial intelligence computer software hackers. (In the case of the poets at least, it doesn't seem that the National Endowment for the Humanities has got the message. Yet, maybe that's changing.)
The deconstruction of metaphysics by Derrida and Lyotard among others, even as this short list would indicate, has provided an invaluable service. However, as Professor Johnson points out, at least in relation to Merleau-Ponty one may speak of "the germ of a postmodern metaphysie," and I would add a elearly non-arrogant one.
A think Professor Johnson is fundamentally right about this "germ of postmodern metaphysie," Let me itemize in somewhat different terms from his, why., in the ease of Merleau-Ponty, metaphysicaJizing does not seem to amount to metaphysieal arrogance.
First, Merleau-Ponty does not privilege a particular category of being over another.
As early as the Phenomenology of Perception, where Merleau-Ponty speaks of the body-world system as neither in-itself nor. for-itself but as a for-itself-for-us (Phenomenology of Perception, p. 372 Fr. ed., p. 322 Eng. eg.), Merleau-Ponty is dedicated to promoting neither subjectivity over objectivity nor the eonverse. Rather he sets out to propose a eoupling, or paet (s'8ccoupler) from whieh they both emerge. In the writings he was oceupied with at his death, this projeet of promoting neither subject nor objeet, essence nor fact, becomes even ·more focal. The description of the self-world interrelation, what he refers to as "the chiasma or intertwining," leads to metaphysical positions only through introdueing various partite and distorting revisions. There is nothing here of the privileging of one metaphysical category over another.
Second, I think it is a misreading of the later Merleau-Ponty to hold his notion of Flesh to be areturn to essentialism. Flesh enables Merleau-Ponty to describe how beings offer themselves in fullness; it is not a conceptualization of whst beings are. Flesh, it can be shown, is a way of designating the way in which the visible and the invisible, the actual and the imaginary are co-present in something whieh we hold be fully there.
And last, I think one can go quite a way to show that Merleau-Ponty avoids privileging a particular language, or for that matter an idiolect, because his concern is often a pre-v~rbal ·world. To return to the late essay on painting again, in the "The Eye and the Mind," Merleau-Ponty holds that the painter recaptures an antepredicative world.
As such metaphysics must be, at least, retrospective.
"The impalpable souree of sensations" which rengages the painter is neither real nor ideal, private or public, neither party to Sameness nor party to Otherness. To be sure, a description of this world which Merleau-Ponty sometimes refers to as Brute Being, (/'Etre slluvIIge), rnay allow metaphysical bias to enter in. However, since the world of the painter is antemetaphyical, descriptions involving metaphysical predicates would self-referentially cancel themselves out, becoming at best heuristic and finally irrelevant.
Time permitting, if I may, I'd also like to make a short comment on Professor Weiss instructive paper.
• Ambiguity, Absurdity and Reversibility: Indeterminacy in de Beauvoir, Camus and Merleau-Ponty.· Professor Weiss's paper shows us the manner in which Camus, de Beauvoir and Merleau~Ponty, in fact, expand upon the equivoc8tion of the notion of indeterminacy. The universe is indifferent to the Camus of The Myth of Sisyphus. Indeterminacy for the early Camus means a confrontation with wtiat is irrepressibly, and implacably, non-human. Indeterminacy for de Beauvoir of the Ethics of Ambiguity means the good ambiguity that leads us to make indistinct subject and object. It is a moral indistinction. Finally with Merleau-Ponty, indeterminacy, at least that which concerns the reversibility of the body, the hand which touches, readies itself to be touched, etc., counts as a rhythm or oscillation between subject and object. If nothing else certainly these appropriations, even distortions, of the notion of indeterminacy 8111 Husserl, suggests how the arrabiguity--or perhaps better, how the the multivocslity of a term--would seem to antedate thought, even as it prepares it and makes it possible.
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